Whether it is deserved or has been constructed by frustrated legal practitioners, individuals that choose to represent themselves in court are not afforded the best of reputations. With impending cuts to legal aid set to leave thousands without legal representation in areas such as divorce, childcare and medical malpractice, though, the number of individuals choosing to represent themselves is only likely to increase. Litigants in person, as they are known in legal circles, have become renowned for their ability to delay legal proceedings. They are, according to lawyers and the judiciary, exceptionally difficult to reason with and unable to comprehend either basic procedure or the intricacies of our common law system. To summarise, more litigants in person will severely hinder courts that are already subject to substantial strain. Whilst these problems have been widely discussed, legislators and institutions have put forward very few informal and absolutely no formal proposals designed to address this situation. Recently though, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury – England and Wales’ second most senior judge – has suggested that the answer to the problem may lie in ‘Public Legal Education,’ which, whilst cryptic, one can reasonably assume means better educating the public on their legal rights, court processes, legal adherence and so on. An interesting idea, no doubt, but one that is unlikely to, if implemented, have any significant effect. Lawyers, after all, are required to spend at least four years at university and then undertake a further two years of training before they can act for a client. Yes, they are trained to deal with a number of situations, but every lecture, every word that it is read, written or spoken during this time plays a significant part in constructing an individual that can transverse the UK’s intricate common law system. How, exactly, could such a flood of information be disseminated amongst the general public quickly, efficiently and, most importantly, economically? Equally relevant is the litigant in person’s individual involvement in their case. Lawyers are, in the most part, more effective than the unrepresented because of their ability to address the matter in a calm and dispassionate manner. News of litigants in person having failed to control themselves during proceedings – particularly when a matter as emotive as a divorce or residence of a child is being arbitrated – are rife and the ability to view a situation objectively simply cannot be taught. Informing the populous of their legal rights is undoubtedly a good idea and could prove to be advantageous in the long term, but it is an intention which would be better served by amendments to our national curriculum. ‘Public Legal Education’ is no more capable of preventing court delays than the coalition government are of arriving at reasoned and sound decisions. Fortunately – and in the interest of ending on a positive note – Neuberger put forward additional and more practicable proposals such as increasing the number of volunteers at services such as the Personal Support Unit, recognising unemployed legal professionals as a valid resource and encouraging more legal firms to engage in pro bono work. Again, these proposals are not without problems - least of all the fact that pro bono work is unlikely to be palatable to lawyers during a recession – but they are infinitely more practical that what, bizarrely, had been Neuberger’s main proposal.